In this paper, we analyze the dynamic relationships between ten stock exchanges of the euro zone using Granger causal networks. Considering returns for which we allow the variance to follow a Markov-Switching GARCH or a Changing-Point GARCH process, we …rst show that over di¤erent periods, the topology of the network is highly unstable. In particular dynamic relationships vanish over very recent years. Then, expanding
Introduction
Consider an electronic component designed to emit a signal which is about to fail, that is about to switch from one state to an other. This component is likely to start emitting abnormal signals, or signals in an abnormal way before the failure, rather than abruptly failing. For instance, we are likely to observe a ‡ickering signal before a phase transition occurs. Consider further the component as part of an electronic device, which is connected to other components, forming then a complex interdependent dynamic system. Two questions then arise: i) What will be the impact of the component's failure on the whole system? In other words, will the electronic device fail because of the failure of one component ? and ii) Is it possible to know in advance that a failure will occur ?
One way to answer the …rst question is to look at the integrated circuit of the device (i.e. the topology) and to focus on the importance of the component in terms of centrality and/or the number of components connected to it (i.e. the degree). To answer the second question, one …rst needs to recover the topology of the system, and next to look at the information di¤usion processes (i.e. the signals) so as to identify abnormal periods prior to the failure at the individual and/or the macro level (i.e. component versus circuit level).
Turning to …nancial systems and systemic risk, the …rst question has been adressed by a number of authors using networks. Relating systemic risk to the concepts of connectedness, contagion, and therefore di¤usion of exogenous and/or endogenous shocks within and/or across …nancial sectors (see Bisias et al. 2012 ), Allen and Gale (2000) as well as Acemoglu et al. (2013) show that highly interconnected networks are more resilient to small shocks but not to large ones. Battiston et al. (2013) focus on the frailty of nodes, and then study cascading e¤ects as Motter and Lai (2002) do. In such models, the focus is set on the impact of the failure of one or several nodes on the whole system. Our paper clearly relates to the second question, that is on early warning indicators prior to a phase transition (i.e. non-crisis versus crisis periods). We consider …nancial systems as being possibly critically self-organized (Bak et al., 1987, Bianconi and Marsili, 2004) . In particular, local interrelations between the system's components build up a coordinated system or network. Such selforganised network/system will turn into a critical behavior (i.e. tipping point and phase transition) without the e¤ect of external forces or drivers. In this light, our main contribution is to provide early warnings of phase transitions for the whole system (or network), which is highly suggestive of systemic risk.
To detect early warnings, we adopt a two-step methodology. First, we recover the network topology using non-causality tests as suggested in Billio and al. (2012) . Nevertheless, we use a di¤erent class of Granger non-causality tests, within the framework of independence tests for time series 1 Once the topology is recovered, we …rst propose a period-speci…c analysis of the contagion process within the network while discriminating between crisis and non-crisis periods. We mainly show that the nodes' states are highly un-stable over time. Expanding on this idea, we identify phase transitions based on the very short-term dynamic di¤usion process of information/shocks accross nodes. Such nodes' short-term di¤usion processes are interpreted as signals.
Our dynamic signal analysis relies on a six-month rolling window, and focuses on triangular clustering patterns or motifs of information di¤usion as de…ned by Faggiolo (2007) , including spillover and feedback e¤ects.
Considering daily data about ten main European stock indices form 1994
to 2014, our …ndings are manyfold: i) With respect to period-speci…c analysis, correlations prevail over the data sample and are regime-dependent. Such correlations increase up to the period following the crisis, and then start decreasing,
ii) Besides, the number of causal relationships as well as their strength increases up to the crisis period but vanishes after the crisis period. Over the remaining sample history, there exist very few and very weak causal relationships, iii)
Based on a rolling window analysis, we …rst show that periods of clustering precede periods of ‡ickering in clustering, which are followed by a tipping point and a phase transition. The phase transition begins with an abrupt clustering phenomenon for all stock exchanges. Such sudden phenomenon indicates a simultaneous phase transition of all stock markets (i.e. synchronized clusters).
Interestingly, ‡ickering periods also highlight times when stock exchanges exhibit desynchronized information ‡ow processes. In particular, Euro zone stock exchanges exhibit clusters'desynchronization approximately one year before the Global Financial Crisis. At last, the end-of-crisis period exhibits an exceptional and speci…c clustering phenomenon, which is followed by the sudden disappearance of clusters. Hence European stock exchanges seem to stop interacting together. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to study clustering, or equiva- 
Econometric methodology
Let r = f(r 
Moreover, as T becomes large, consider that returns might also exhibit breaks in their volatility process. Then, de…ne a more realistic Data Generating Process (DGP) as:
Equation (7) 
where
or by:
where P S corresponds to a Markov switching process with K +1 regimes, and P C describes a change-point process with K breaks. Then, de…ne the estimated normalized return b
t , i = 1; 2; :::; N: Next, we build binary and weighted undirected networks (BUN, WUN) as well as binary and weighted directed networks (BDN, WDN). A binary network is described by a graph G = (N; A), where N is the number of nodes, here the number of stocks, and A = fa ij g is the N N adjacency matrix. For binary networks, nodes i and j are connected by an edge if a ij = 1. For a graph G = (N; A), de…ne the indegree, outdegree and total degree for node i as:
where A 0 is the transpose of A:
Also of interest are the bilateral edges between i and j, i.e. a ij = 1 and a ji = 1:
The weighted networks parallel the binary one. They are de…ned by the graph G = (N; W) where W = fw ij g is a matrix of weights ranging from 0 to 1. (0) and C (12) b (k) as:
the correlations and cross-correlations are de…ned as:
and:
2 In particular, instead of cross correlations, we have also used partial cross-correlations and then used a LR test. All codes available at peretti@univ-paris1.fr Then the null of non-correlation or independence can be tested using the portmanteau statistic:
Under the null of non-signi…cance of cross correlations at all leads and lags, Q M is distributed as a Chi-square with (2M + 1)d1d2 degrees of freedom.
Using the above statistic,Granger non-causality tests are easy to derive by summing over f1; M g or f M; 1g. For instance, testing for Granger non-
) amounts to computing the test statistic:
Similarly, to test for non-causality from
, one is to use:
Under the null, both tests (18) and (19) are chi-square distributed with M d1d2 degrees of freedom.
All above tests are portmanteau tests. It is also useful to look at the significance of an individual lead/lag. A natural test statistic is given by:
which is also chi-square distributed with d1d2 degrees of freedom.
In this paper, to build BUN and WUN we use (17) with k = 0 and M = 7
and (20) with k = 0. Therefore, an edge exists between two nodes, if the test is rejected at the 5% threshold. For BDN and WDN we use (18), (19) and (20) with k 6 = 0; M = 7 (and M = 1 for 20), and this for each pair of the set b .
3 Data properties and orthogonalization 
Zg corresponding to European stock exchanges, and b Bench = fb index. In the sequel, all tests are implemented on this set.
Period-based analysis
We …rst perform our analysis over 6 di¤erent periods given by Table ( and then seems to vanish. As a result, the closer we get to the crisis period, the more mutually dependent stock exchanges become, due to the increasing strength of their network. All stock exchanges being connected during the crisis, connections' strength reaches their highest level by that time. However, some stock exchanges start disconnecting after the crisis period. Furthermore, Greece exhibits a weak connection to the Euro zone network of stock exchanges.
Thus, even if the Greek stock exchange is risky, its has a reduced impact on
other Euro zone stock exchanges. Please insert here Figures (3) and (4) The network representations corresponding to heatmaps in Figure ( (5), (6) and (7). Corresponding network representations are provided for the six periods covering the data sample (see Table 3 ). Such between stock exchanges). Thus, we observe clearly the directional propagation of shocks across stock market places over time.
Please insert here Figures (5), (6) and (7) 5 Flickering in information transmission
One major result of the previous section is that the topology of the network changes from one period to another. Speci…cally, information transmission channels within the network are unstable over time, which leads to complex patterns of transmitted and emitted signals. It is therefore of interest to focus on such an unstability in order to: i) Check if the evolution of certain patterns of information transmission match with the di¤erent phases of the …nancial market as reported in Table ( 3), ii) Determine early warning indicators, preceding tipping points or phase transitions.
Please insert We use a six-month rolling window, and focus on the very short-term (K 1)
information di¤usion schemes, and in particular, on speci…c triangular patterns or motifs as de…ned by Faggiolo (2007) . Table ( Results are displayed in Figures (8) , (10) and (11) . Figure ( 2012), the relevant information, may not be the increase in degrees before a …nancial crisis, but rather the ‡ickering in degrees, which occurs after their increase (e.g. during the pre-crisis period).
Focusing on the Global Financial Crisis period, it is interesting to notice that it begins with an abrupt change in clustering (phase transition) for the whole system, and also ends with an abrupt change. Over the post crisis period, clustering totaly disappears, which is line with our previous causality tests.
Anecdotal results show that the sovereign debt crisis period begins and ends with a sudden rise in clustering. As a consequence, our methodology's added-values are twofold. First, we are able to detect forthcoming phase transitions, and second, we are able to date crises' beginnings and ends. Such dating matches with the di¤erent market phases reported in Table ( 3). Therefore ‡ickering precedes a phase transition and acts as an early warning.
Flickering phenomena as early warning signals have been reported in complex systems, especially in ecology (e.g. Dakos et al., 2013) as well as in climatology (Livina et al., 2010) . Interestingly, Dakos et al. (2013) noticed that ‡ickering between basins of attraction may appear far before bifurcation or tipping points, and could then be used as early warnings. To our knowledge, this is the …rst time that ‡ickering in information di¤usion processes is studied, exhibited and described in …nancial systems.
In addition to rapid ‡ickering, before a tipping point occurs, the information di¤usion process starts desynchronizing accross nodes. We observe either asynchonicity of signals or arising noises within the system. To handle such pattern, we compute a dummy variable taking a unit value if the node enters total clustering, and 0 otherwise. Then, we divide the pre-crisis period into four equal sub-samples, and compute the Jaccard similarity coe¢ cient over each sub-sample to capture the transition from synchronicity to asynchronicity. The so that the number of connections and their related strength were highly timevarying. Strikingly, there remain very few causal relationships at the end of our data sample (i.e. post-sovereign debt crisis period), indicating that contagion over these recent years seems to be low. Such information is of huge signi…cance to the regulatory authority (e.g. monitoring and marking-to-market processes, assessment of risk exposures, gauging contagion risk). Expanding on the unstability of the topology, we have focused on motifs of information di¤usion processes (i.e. triangular clusters) in order to capture early warnings of phase transition. We have shown that the whole system exhibited ‡ickering information clusters with a high degree of desynchronization before a phase transition occurs. As a consequence, ‡ickering in information transmission can act as an early warning signal, and the degree of desynchonization reveals the vicinity of a tipping point. Our analysis, also allows to date crisis periods. To our knowledge, this is the …rst time that ‡ickering in clusters is identi…ed in complex …nancial systems. The ability to extract early warnings about forthcoming crises is useful to regulators in order to take preventive measures and mitigate contagion risk. Such tool could e¢ ciently help regulators undertake their monitoring and supervisory activities.
There is an avenue for future research within this area. One would consist in enlarging our dataset to include credit defaults swaps as well as bonds. Another direction could be to study cascading errors, and then relating our network to the riskiness of nodes. 
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